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I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to assisted reproductive technologies (ART) remains 
largely unregulated.  While some federal and state laws and 
professional guidelines may prevent or discourage certain kinds of 
discrimination, health care providers can and do withhold services 
from prospective patients for many reasons.  Most recently, as 
reported in North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc. v. San Diego 
County Superior Court, Guadalupe Benitez was refused ART services 
because she was unmarried and a lesbian.1
 
      †  Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.  The author wishes to thank Adam 
Sherwin and Cynthia Lewis for their research assistance. 
 1. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008). 
  Surveys of fertility 
clinics in the United States show that this kind of discrimination is 
not unusual. 
1
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The Hospital Survey and Construction Act, commonly known 
as the Hill-Burton Act or Hill-Burton Program, was enacted in 
1946.2  Its purpose was to make federal funds available to 
communities across the nation “to furnish adequate hospital, clinic 
or similar services to all their people.”3  Facilities that received Hill-
Burton funds were required to 1) ensure that services were 
provided to all members of the community, and 2) provide a 
certain amount of free medical services to those in need.4
II. ART: ACCESS DENIED 
 
This article explores the question of whether or not the Hill-
Burton Act may be used by those persons, like Ms. Benitez, who are 
denied access to assisted reproductive technologies for non-medical 
reasons, such as marital status or sexual orientation.  After 
documenting the discriminatory treatment of potential ART 
patients, and then looking at the history and language of the Act 
along with judicial interpretations thereof, I conclude that Hill-
Burton may provide a tool to challenge discrimination in provision 
of ART services. 
Assisted reproductive technologies are being used by 
increasing numbers of people for whom such technologies 
represent their best—and in most cases, only—means of having a 
child. Since 1981, more than 177,000 infants have been born 
through the use of ART; in the year 2000, 100,000 cycles of ART 
were attempted.5  The provision of these services has raised 
numerous ethical and social issues, including the question of 
whether or not ART should be available to all who request it, or 
whether certain persons, or persons with certain characteristics, 
should be excluded.  One study calls this phenomenon an “access 
to services” issue, defined as a “dilemma caused by the presence of 
behaviors or conditions in the patient that the provider finds to be 
so problematic for ethical or other reasons that the provider is 
uncomfortable treating this individual.”6
 
 2. Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 291–291m).  The Hill-Burton Program was updated in 1975.  Pub. L. No. 
93-641, 88 Stat. 2268 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300q–300t). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2000). 
 4. National Health Law Project, A Hill-Burton Primer, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
13, 13 (1985). 
 5. Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 61 (2005). 
  Some providers of ART 
 6. Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services at Assisted Reproductive Technology 
2
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services have established policies that prohibit their use by single 
persons or same-sex couples.7  Other providers may be less specific 
and less direct, opting to judge individuals seeking their help on a 
case by case basis.  In some cases, “the welfare of the child” may be 
a dispositive factor in the decision to offer or withhold treatment.  
This means that an individual provider can and does weigh many 
aspects of a prospective patient, which include judgments about his 
or her potential parenting abilities.8  In one survey, 64% of ART 
program directors stated their belief that it is their responsibility to 
consider the parents’ fitness before helping them to conceive.9
The nature of this access to services issue may be peculiar to 
assisted reproductive technologies as opposed to other more 
routine kinds of medical care.  Refusal to provide treatment may 
spring from the unique characteristic of this kind of medical 
service; that is, that the result of the treatment, if successful, is a 
child.  Thus, providers of this service may feel a responsibility not 
just to the potential patient but to the resulting child as well.  In an 
instance when a physician may think that a potential patient would 
not be a “good” parent because she is single, or lesbian, or 
overweight, or too poor, the physician may experience a conflict 
between wanting to serve a patient’s needs and what he or she 
perceives as the welfare of the child.  This may be appropriate in 
some cases.  The problem is trying to define those instances in 
which concerns about a patient’s lifestyle and life conditions are 
legitimate enough to override a right to reproduce, and those 
instances that constitute improper and possibly illegal 
discrimination against the patient.  One commentator states: 
“[w]ell-intended efforts to prevent the birth of a baby to a parent 
with a known history of violence against children could perhaps 
slide into discriminatory or eugenic practices to prevent those who 
are poor, who follow nonmainstream lifestyles, or who are 
 
 
Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 188:4 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 591, 591 
(2001). 
 7. Id. at 596 (showing that only 79% of clinics surveyed treat single women 
and 74% treat lesbian couples).  See also Gurmankin, supra note 5, at 66 tbl.7 
(showing that 10% of clinics surveyed were “very or extremely likely” to turn away 
single women and 50% to turn away single men; 17% were “very or extremely 
likely” to turn away lesbian couples and 48% to turn away gay male couples). 
 8. See generally Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, Child-Rearing Ability and the Provision of Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 564 (2004). 
 9. Gurmankin, supra note 5, at 63. 
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members of a racial minority from having children.”10
The facts in the recent case of Guadalupe Benitez exemplify, 
although they do not exhaust, the nature of and reasons behind 
these kinds of treatment decisions.
 
11  Ms. Benitez sought assisted 
reproductive services at North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group 
in San Diego County.12  Benitez had attempted self-insemination 
without success and was diagnosed and referred to North Coast for 
treatment for polycystic ovarian syndrome.13  During a visit with one 
provider, Dr. Brody, Benitez mentioned that she was a lesbian.14  
The provider reportedly told Benitez that if intrauterine 
insemination (IUI) proved necessary, she (the provider) could not 
participate, as her religious convictions prevented her from 
performing ART procedures on unmarried women.15  She also said 
that her colleague, Dr. Fenton, had similar beliefs but that two 
other physicians in the practice would be available to assist 
Benitez.16  When further attempts at self-insemination did not 
produce a pregnancy, Benitez opted for the IUI procedure, using 
the fresh sperm of a friend.17  Dr. Brody informed her that North 
Coast had to consult its own protocols on use of fresh sperm from a 
non-husband.18  Benitez then decided to forgo the fresh sperm in 
favor of sperm from a sperm bank.19  Dr. Brody then went on 
vacation, leaving the care of Benitez to Dr. Fenton.20
There was confusion as to Benitez’s decision to use sperm 
from a sperm bank, and Dr. Fenton believed that she still wanted to 
use the fresh sperm from the known donor.
 
21  This posed 
problems, as only Dr. Fenton was licensed to perform this kind of 
procedure.22
 
 10. Id. at 62. 
 11. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 
959 (Cal. 2008). 
 12. Id. at 963. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  Apparently Dr. Brody was willing to provide some care to Ms. Benitez, 
but drew the line at this particular procedure. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 964. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
  But he too, like Dr. Brody, had religious objections, 
and the remaining physicians did not possess the necessary 
4
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expertise.23  Benitez was therefore referred to a provider outside of 
the North Coast practice.24
Benitez filed an action against the physicians and North Coast, 
claiming sexual orientation discrimination in violation of 
California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act.
 
25  Defendants responded that 
they were exercising their rights to freedom of religious expression 
under the First Amendment.  The California Supreme Court 
ultimately held against Defendants on the First Amendment 
argument; whether the case continues remains to be seen, as 
Defendants now wish to assert that the basis of discrimination was 
marital status, not sexual orientation.  Marital status, apparently, is 
not covered by the Unruh Act.26
Constraints on the ability of ART providers to refuse services 
exist in some form, but are relatively weak.  Generally speaking, 
and with the exception of emergency treatment, physicians are not 
required to treat all patients who seek their services.  Some state 
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital status and 
sexual orientation exist, but they are spotty in the sense that many 
states have no such legislation and those that do vary in the kinds of 
discrimination they prohibit and to which kinds of entities they 
apply.
 
27  As for professional self-regulation, the American Medical 
Association has issued a resolution that healthcare providers should 
not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in the provision 
of health care.28
 
 23. Id. 
 24. It is important to note that issues of access cannot always be resolved 
by referral to another facility.  In the North Coast case, North Coast was the 
only OB-GYN provider in Ms. Benitez’s health insurance plan.  Therefore she 
had no choice other than North Coast, and her subsequent treatment and 
pregnancy had to be paid out-of-pocket.  Lambda Legal, Benitez v. North 
Coast Women’s Care Medical Group (Q & A) (June 22, 2005), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/our-work/publications/facts-backgrounds/ 
page.jsp?itemID=31987395. 
 25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2006). 
 26. Id.  The Act provides that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this 
state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, disability, [or] medical condition.” Id.  The act had been 
construed to include sexual orientation and was formally amended to include this 
in 2005.  Id. 
 27. Susan B. Apel, Access to Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 12 J.  MED. & L. 33, 
37–41 (2008) (discussing state law conscience clauses and recent attempted 
legislation on this issue); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral 
Clashes Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 50–52 
(discussing state law conscience clauses). 
  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
 28. See AM. MED. ASS’N, GBLT POLICY COMPENDIUM 1 (Sept. 2005), 
5
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(ASRM) along with its affiliate organization, the Society for Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (SART), frowns upon discrimination 
against same-sex individuals and single people.29  It does, however, 
uphold the ability of providers to make decisions about access 
based upon the providers’ judgments regarding the welfare of the 
potential child.30
To return to Benitez and for purposes of this analysis, the legal 
procedures and conclusions in this case may be less relevant than 
the facts.  The facts are that the fertility clinic turned Benitez away, 
either because she was single or because she was a lesbian.
  The positions that ASRM has taken are in the 
form of ethics committee reports, which are advisory in nature and 
for which there are no effective enforcement mechanisms. 
31
III. THE HILL-BURTON ACT: HISTORY AND EXPLANATION 
  If the 
latter, Benitez had the good fortune to live in a state that includes 
sexual orientation in its state anti-discrimination legislation.  If the 
former, Benitez may be without legal recourse under state law.  
And those patients who are refused service for reasons less 
categorical than marital status or sexual orientation—who, for 
example, have been deemed less than ideal potential parents—may 
have the least protection of all under any existing law. 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Hospital Survey and 
Construction Act, popularly called the Hill-Burton Act or Hill-
Burton Program.32  The Act was passed in response to a perceived 
shortage of hospitals throughout the nation.33  The Act made 




 29. See generally Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 86 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1333 (5th ed. Nov. 2006). 
 30. See generally supra note 8, at 564. 
 31. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Superior Court, 189 P.3d 
959, 963–65 (Cal. 2008). 
 32. Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291–
291m). 
 33. Peter D. Jacobson, Health Law 2005: An Agenda, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 725 
(2005). 
 34. Id. 
  The Hill-Burton Program “was not intended 
only to provide funding construction and modernization of 
medical institutions.  As the language of the authorizing legislation, 
its legislative history, and the overall structure of the program 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/10
  
418 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:2 
demonstrate, Congress also intended that medical services be 
provided in areas where they were especially needed and under 
conditions designed to carry out specified congressional 
objectives.”35  Those hospitals or other facilities who received 
federal funds under the Act were required to 1) make available the 
services provided to all persons within their territorial area and 2) 
provide a reasonable volume of services to persons unable to pay.36  
The first requirement is referred to as the “community service 
assurance,” and the second, the “uncompensated care assurance.”37
Hill-Burton was revised several times over the ensuing years.
 
38  
In 1975, a revamped Hill-Burton Program,39 codified as Title XVI of 
the Public Health Services Act, retained almost the exact 
community assurance requirement as its original Title VI 
counterpart, with one exception that broadened the coverage of 
persons to whom services would be made available.  Programs 
originally funded under Title VI were required to provide services 
to all persons residing in the territorial area covered by the facility.  
Under the revised program, coverage was extended not only to 
residents, but “to all persons residing or employed in the area served 
by the facility.”40
. . . the community service obligation prior to 1979 had been 
virtually ignored.”
 
The greatest concerns about and challenges to the Hill-Burton 
Program were focused more on the uncompensated care assurance 
rather than the community service requirement.  One 
commentator said that “while the uncompensated service 
obligation has been a subject of controversy among the 
government, the hospital industry, and various consumer groups  
41
 
 35. Kenneth R. Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health 
Facilities, 23 B.C. L. REV. 577, 578 (1982) (providing an excellent and detailed 
legislative history of the Act). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c(e)(1)–(2) (2000) (amending prior section 291c, act 
July 1, 1944, ch. 373, ch. 373, title VI, § 613). 
  Even a casual look at scholarly and other 
 37. See Wing, supra note 35, at 578. 
 38. See Margaret Lynch Huddleston, Due Process for Hill-Burton Assisted Facilities, 
32 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1469–75 (1979) (describing the evolution of the Hill-
Burton statute and regulations from its inception until 1979). 
 39. For purposes of this article, the revised program and the original 
program will both be referred to as “Hill-Burton.” See Pub. L. No. 79-725 § 622, 60 
Stat. 1040 (1946). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 300s-1 (b)(1)(k) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 41. Wing, supra note 35, at 580; see also National Health Law Program, A Hill-
Burton Primer: Putting Flesh on the Bones of the Hill-Burton Community Service 
Regulations, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 13 (1st ed. May 1985) (stating that “[M]ost 
7
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literature, as well as court opinions, shows that the community 
service obligation was definitely the poorer cousin to the free care 
requirement, receiving relatively little attention or comment. 
By the 1970s, it appeared that while Hill-Burton had been 
successful in funding hospital construction,42 it had been less 
successful in getting the recipients of its funds to live up to their 
community service or free-care obligations.43  “Commentators 
generally are in agreement that, for nearly twenty-five years, 
enforcement of the Hill-Burton Act’s uncompensated care and 
community service assurances existed only in precatory, exhortative 
language.”44  Throughout the 1970s, and culminating in 1979, the 
Department of Health and Human Services issued regulations, 
adding greater depth and showing more propensity for 
enforcement, especially of the heretofore ignored community 
service requirement.45
In order to comply with its community service assurance, a 
facility shall make the services provided in the facility or 
portion thereof constructed, modernized, or converted 
with Federal assistance under Title VI or XVI of the Act 
available to all persons residing (and, in the case of 
facilities assisted under Title XVI of the Act, employed) in 
the facility’s service area without discrimination on the ground 
of race, color, national origin, creed, or any other ground 
unrelated to an individual’s need for the service or the 
availability of the needed service in the facility.
  The regulation adopted in 1979 states as 
follows: 
46
There has been some, but little, litigation under the 
community service assurance provisions of the statute and 
 
 
health care advocates are familiar with the free care obligations.  The community 
service requirements are less familiar.”). 
 42. “[F]rom 1946 to 1976, the Hill-Burton program supported the 
construction of 40% of hospital beds in the United States.”  Peter D. Jacobsen, 
Health Law 2005: An Agenda, 33 J.L. MED & ETHICS 725, 732 (2005).  See also James 
A. Morone, The Health Care Bureaucracy: Small Changes, Big Consequences, 18 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 723 (Fall 1993).  In the first thirty years of its existence, 
“Hill-Burton funds contributed to almost a third of [all] hospital construction 
projects in America.”  Id. at 727. 
 43. Jacobson, supra note 33, at 732; A Hill-Burton Primer, supra note 4, at 13 
(noting that “[n]o compliance standards were established [in the original act]; the 
result was that both obligations were virtually ignored for 25 years.”). 
 44. James F. Blumstein, Court Action, Agency Reaction: The Hill-Burton Act as a 
Case Study, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1227, 1238 (1984). 
 45. See 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(1) (2008). 
 46. Id. (emphasis added). 
8
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pertinent regulations.  The 1979 regulations were challenged 
generally in American Hospital Association v. Schweiker47 as being 
beyond the scope of the statute.  The court upheld the regulations, 
disputing the hospital association’s contention that Hill-Burton was 
merely a construction statute with the community services 
assurance provision being incidental.48  The court held that the 
requirement of providing services to individuals was an integral 
part of the statute, and that the Secretary had broad authority in 
enacting the regulations.49  In Wyoming Hospital Association v. 
Harris,50 the court also upheld the regulations, including those 
pertinent to the community service obligation.  In this case, 
plaintiffs acknowledged that while the statute was intended to 
counter discrimination, they believed that the regulations were 
overbroad.51  In particular, plaintiffs were troubled by part of the 
regulations that specified certain hospital policies that would run 
afoul of the community service provision.52  Some of the examples 
included admissions policies that would preclude a large segment 
of the population, such as a requirement that would restrict 
admission to only those patients whose physicians had privileges to 
practice in the hospital.53  Another example was a requirement for 
preadmission deposits.54  The court disagreed with plaintiffs, 
holding that the community service obligation is not limited to 
traditional kinds of discrimination; it upheld the Secretary’s power 
to issue the regulations.55  In other cases, plaintiffs sought to flesh 
out what “all persons” meant in the language of the Act.  In Cook v. 
Ochsner Foundation Hospital,56
More recent post-1979 cases include League of United Latin 
American Citizens v. Wilson.
 the court found that a hospital’s 
exclusion (or sparing acceptance) of Medicaid patients resulted in 
violation of the community service assurance. 
57
 
 47. 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 48. Id. at 176. 
 49. Id. at 178. 
 50. 727 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 51. Id. at 938. 
 52. Id. at 940. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 939. 
 55. Id. at 940. 
 56. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972).  This case was actually based on the statute 
and the 1972 regulations and is thought to be one of the catalysts to the revision of 
the regulations in 1979. 
 57. 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
  The case involved challenges to 
9
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California Proposition 187, which required the denial of medical 
care and other government services to certain immigrants.58  
Plaintiffs argued that the state initiative was preempted by the 
Federal Constitution and other federal laws, including Hill-
Burton.59  Regarding the denial of healthcare benefits by public-
funded healthcare facilities, the court regarded the “all persons” 
language of the statute, and the “any other ground” language of 
the regulations.60  It held that “because Hill-Burton facilities must 
make their services available to all persons without regard to 
immigration status, the operation of section 6 [of Proposition 187] 
conflicts with the requirements of the Hill-Burton Act.”61
Finally, in Aghazadeh v. Maine Medical Center,
 
62 plaintiffs 
brought a claim under Hill-Burton for discrimination based upon 
language proficiency.  Plaintiffs spoke little or no English, and the 
local hospital failed to provide interpreters, thereby functionally 
excluding a sizeable portion of persons in its territory.63  The court 
held that the hospital had violated the community assurance 
requirement of the Hill-Burton Act.64
In enacting the 1979 regulations, comments to the regulations 
indicate a clarification, or broader view of persons “residing” in the 
covered territory.  They define a person “residing” in an area as 
someone who: “(i) [i]s living in the service area with the intention 
to remain there permanently or for an indefinite period; (ii) [i]s 
living in the service area for purposes of employment; or (iii) [i]s 
living with a family member who resides in the service area.”
 
65  As 
well as adding the “employment” category as an alternate reason 
for inclusion, the comments note that it was intended, among 
other things, to bring migrant workers under the protection of the 
Act.66
Commentators on this anti-discrimination provision of Hill-
Burton and its regulations have suggested that other kinds of 
discrimination fall within its purview.  One commentator calls the 
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 782. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 783. 
 62. No. 98-421-P-C., 1999 WL 33117182 (D. Me. June 8, 1999). 
 63. Id. at *1. 
 64. Id. at *9. 
 65. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(a)(2) (2008). 
 66. Medical Facility Construction and Modernization; Requirements for 
Provision of Services to Persons Unable to Pay and Community Service by Assisted 
Health Facilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,399 (May 18, 1979). 
10
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community service provision “one of the clearest opportunities for 
courts to interpret legislation to reduce inequalities in access to 
health care services.”67
[A]s defined by the regulations, the community service 
obligation is far more than a proscription on 
discrimination in the usual sense of that term.  Under the 
new regulations a hospital is required to accept virtually 
without exception anyone who is able to pay for medical 
services.  Thus, people who do not have a physician on the 
facility’s medical staff; people who “probably can pay” but 
do not have cash, credit, or third party payment available; 
Medicaid and Medicare recipients; and at least by 
implication, the privately insured, would be assured access 
by the regulations.
  Kenneth Wing states: 
68
More specifically, another commentator states that the Office 
of Civil Rights (which is charged with enforcing Hill-Burton) “[h]as 
consistently taken the position that the community service 
obligation requires hospitals to address the needs of LEP [limited 
English proficiency] patients.”
 
69  Exclusion of AIDS patients from 
hospitals may violate Hill-Burton,70 as may the refusal to treat 
undocumented aliens.71
 
 67. Jacobson, supra note 
  Hill-Burton bans discrimination based on 
33, at 732.  The author does despair, however, of the 
seeming invisibility of Hill-Burton as an effective tool when he laments that “in a 
2000 volume devoted entirely to health inequality in the U.S., Hill-Burton is not 
even mentioned as a potential legal remedy.”  Id. 
 68. Wing, supra note 35, at 581. 
 69. Jane Perkins, Overcoming Language Barriers to Health Care, 65 POPULAR 
GOV’T 38, 42 (1999), available at http://www.sog.unc.edu/pubs/ 
electronicversions/pg/f99-3844.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2008) (citing U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., GUIDE TO PLANNING THE HILL-BURTON COMMUNITY 
SERVICE COMPLIANCE REVIEW 16, 27 (1981)). 
 70. Ziyad I. Naccasha, The Permissibility of Routine AIDS Testing in the Health Care 
Context, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 223, 251 n.172 (1990); Constance 
H. Baker & Megan M. Arthur, AIDS in the Hospital Workplace: Theories of Hospital 
Liability, 24 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 6–7 (1988); Troyen A. Brennan, Ensuring Adequate 
Health Care for the Sick: The Challenge of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome as an 
Occupational Disease, 1988 DUKE L.J. 29, 36–37 (1988); Anne Bitton Gavzy & James 
V. Hetzel, To Treat or Not to Treat: Healthcare Providers’ Duties, 126 N.J. LAW. 52, 53 
(1989). 
 71. Michael J. McKeefery, A Call to Move Forward: Pushing Past the Unworkable 
Standard That Governs Undocumented Immigrants’ Access to Health Care Under Medicaid, 
10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 391, 397 (2007); Randall Kyle Hawes, California 
Proposition 187: Will the Populist Mandate Survive Constitutional Scrutiny?, 37 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 1391, 1406–07 (1996); Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented 
Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 282 (1992) (citing National Health Law Program, A 
Hill-Burton Primer, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 13, 17 (1985)); Peter L. Reich, Public 
Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law Into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 
11
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insurance status.72  At least one scholar sees Hill-Burton as a viable 
claim in sex discrimination cases in healthcare contexts.73
IV. COMMUNITY SERVICE ASSURANCE: CAN IT BE APPLIED TO ART? 
 
The National Women’s Law Center has taken the position that 
discrimination in access to assisted reproductive services on the 
basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or other non-medical 
reasons constitutes a violation of the Hill-Burton Act.74  
Considering the Benitez case as an example, if North Coast were a 
recipient of Hill-Burton funds, would the community service 
obligation prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or marital status?  Can the community service provision 
be read to prohibit refusing ART services to any patient who can 
pay for the services?75
The plain meaning of the statute (“all persons”) and, more 
explicitly, the regulations, say yes.  The terms prohibiting the 
refusal of services—“or any other ground unrelated to the 
individual’s need for the service”—is as open and inclusive as it 
could possibly be.  Earlier in its history, there was some suggestion 
that the real purpose of the anti-discrimination language in Hill-
Burton was to prevent racial discrimination only.  This may be 
because of a one-time prohibition in the Hill-Burton statute that 
specifically mentioned race; the language was that “such hospital     
 
 
219, 233 n.88 (1991). 
 72. Alan Jenkins & Sabrineh Ardalan, Positive Health: The Human Right to 
Health Care Under the New York State Constitution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 479, 532 
(2008); Sara Rosenbaum, A Dose of Reality: Assessing the Federal Trade 
Commission/Department of Justice Report in an Uninsured, Undeserved, and Vulnerable 
Population Context, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 657, 661 (2006). 
 73. Carol Jonann Bess, Gender Bias in Health Care: A Life or Death Issue for 
Women With Coronary Artery Disease, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 41, 59–60 (1995). 
 74. Judith Waxman & Jill Morrison, Letter to the Editor, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
1032, 1032 (2008).  Their position was met with neutrality by the editors, who 
stated that “we encountered a spectrum of reactions to the argument, from 
agreement to skepticism, regarding the applicability of the Act in this context.”  
Robert Brzyski, Reply of the Committee, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1032, 1033 (2008).  
This exchange was the inspiration for this article. 
 75. Ability to pay in this context is a tricky concept that requires that one 
keep separate the two Hill-Burton obligations.  Under the community service 
requirement, the regulations state specifically that, except in an emergency, a 
facility may deny services to persons unable to pay for them.  42 C.F.R.  
§ 124.603(a)(1) (2008).  It adds, however: “unless those persons are required to be 
provided uncompensated services under the provisions of Subpart F [the 
uncompensated care assurance].”  Id. 
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. . . will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial 
area of the applicant, without discrimination on account of race, 
creed, or color.”76  There followed a separate-but-equal exception, a 
classic concept in the history of racial discrimination.  And in fact, 
hospitals given Hill-Burton grants segregated patients according to 
race,77 many of them in southern states.78  This separate-but-equal 
exception was struck down by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit as unconstitutional.79  This resulted in a change to the 
statute in 1964, which eliminated the separate-but-equal exception 
and specific references to racial and other kinds of discrimination.  
The new community services assurance read simply, “[T]he facility  
. . . will be made available to all persons residing in the territorial 
area of the applicant.”80  Kenneth Wing concludes: “there can be 
no doubt that when Congress revised and recodified the 
authorizing legislation for Hill-Burton in 1964 it intended the 
program to impose a general community service requirement on 
recipient facilities, a requirement broader than a simple ban on 
racial discrimination.”81 And again, “the prohibition of racial 
discrimination and conformance to the Simkins case was one major 
concern, but Congress rejected repeated and vocal suggestions to 
prohibit racial discrimination but not to require general 
availability.”82
Wing was writing in 1982.  And while, as previously discussed, 
the community service assurance has not generated much 
litigation, that which exists before and after Wing’s observations 
can be fairly described as a broad interpretation of the “available to 
all persons” language.  When agencies and courts determine that a 
statute provides for inclusion of racial minorities, immigrants, 
 
 
 76. Act of Aug. 13, 1946, 60 Stat. 1043 (amending Section 622(f) of the Hill-
Burton Act). 
 77. Wing, supra note 35, at 601; see also P. Preston Reynolds, Hospitals and Civil 
Rights, 1945–1963: The Case of Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 126 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 898, 899 (1997). 
 78. Marianne Engelman Lado, Unfinished Agenda: The Need for Civil Rights 
Litigation to Address Race Discrimination and Inequalities in Health Care Delivery, 6 TEX. 
F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 19 (2001) (noting that “approximately ‘2,000 hospitals and 
medical facilities in 11 Southern states had received over one-half billion dollars 
for new construction under the Act’” (citation omitted) around the time of the 
Simkins case). 
 79. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959, 969 (4th Cir. 
1963). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976). 
 81. Wing, supra note 35, at 602. 
 82. Id. at 607. 
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migrant workers, and persons with deficiencies in speaking English, 
and when commentators suggest that it covers AIDS patients, 
Medicaid and Medicare patients, undocumented aliens, and 
women, it is hardly a leap to include the unmarried and gay or 
lesbian individuals, as well as others, within the umbrella of 
statutory protection.  At a minimum, given the broad language and 
purpose of the statute, the burden of proof and persuasion should 
fall on those who claim it is not applicable. 
V. OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING HILL-BURTON 
A. The Hill-Burton Program is no longer active. 
Funding of hospitals and other medical facilities under Hill-
Burton ceased in 1997.83  As we move further away from that date, 
one must ascertain whether recipients of Hill-Burton monies retain 
any of the obligations that formed the conditions of their funding.  
While the uncompensated service provisions were to last twenty 
years from the date of completion of construction,84 this limitation 
is not true of the community service assurance, at least as of 1979.85
 
 83. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Hill-Burton Free and Reduced 
Cost Health Care, http://www.hrsa.gov/hillburton/default.htm (last visited Nov. 
30, 2008). 
 84. 42 C.F.R. § 124.501(b)(i) (2007).  In some cases, the obligation to 
provide free care may extend beyond the twenty years if a facility does not 
provide sufficient service to remedy any deficit within the original twenty-year 
period.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-968, THE HILL-BURTON 
UNCOMPENSATED SERVICES PROGRAM 2–3 (2005), https://www.policyarchive. 
org/bitstream/handle/10207/719/98-968_20050523.pdf. 
  
What this means is that while the passage of time may allow 
recipients to abandon the provision of free care, the obligation to 
provide service “to all persons” within the territory exists in 
perpetuity.  Thus, for purposes of the anti-discrimination aspect of 
the Act, it does not matter when a facility received the funding; it 
matters only that the funding was in fact received. 
 85. See 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 18, 1979); see also Wing, supra note 35, at 618 
n.163 (explaining that there is no durational limit on the community service 
obligation as defined in the 1979 regulations).  Earlier regulations may have 
placed a durational limit on the community service obligation, but the courts in 
Cook v. Ochsner, 61 F.R.D. 354 (E. D. La. 1972) and Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28 
(N. D. Ohio 1976), found that the statute did not provide for such a limit.  
Huddleston, supra note 38, at 1473 n.39. 
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B. An individual seeking services may not be within the territorial area 
served by the facility. 
The territory served by the facility is one that has been defined 
by the facility and accepted by the federal government in the 
facility’s plan as the “service area.”86  An individual seeking medical 
care would have to reside in the area, or if the facility were funded 
under the newer Act, could either reside or be employed there.87
C. Identifying Hill-Burton facilities may be difficult. 
  
Thus in any claim of discrimination, one would have to ascertain 
whether the prospective patient meets this criterion.  While 
generally there are numerous facilities offering fertility services, 
that may not be true in some locations, such as rural areas where 
healthcare facilities of any kind are fewer.  This may mean that in a 
given geographic area, there may be no facilities with a history of 
Hill-Burton funding. 
Perhaps because funding programs under Hill-Burton has 
ceased, it is difficult to discover up-to-date statistics about Hill-
Burton facilities, including which entities received funds under the 
Act and when.  The Department of Health and Human Services, 
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) maintains a 
website that identifies Hill-Burton recipients; at present the website 
states that there are 218 obligated facilities.88  Given the paucity of 
the number, this information refers only to those Hill-Burton 
recipients who still have obligations to provide free care, i.e., those 
for whom the applicable twenty years has not yet expired.89  
Because the community service obligation exists forever, any facility 
that received Hill-Burton funds at any time would still have to 
provide services “to all persons” within its service area.90
 
 86. 42 C.F.R. § 124.602 (2007). 
 87. See id. § 124.603(a)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 88. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Hill-Burton Free and Reduced 
Cost Health Care,  http://www.hrsa.gov/hillburton/default.htm (last visited Dec. 
1, 2008). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Medical Facility Construction and Modernization; Requirements for 
Provision of Services to Persons Unable to Pay and Community Service by Assisted 
Health Facilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 18, 1979) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
124). 
  In the 
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absence of easily available information of all Hill-Burton funded 
entities (at least 7000 at the time of the 1979 regulations),91
D. Some may mistakenly believe that Hill-Burton facilities are always 
located in a hospital and applicable only to inpatient care. 
 one 
seeking to challenge a refusal of services would have to request this 
information from the Department of Health and Human Services, 
or in informal or formal discovery in litigation against the facility. 
Because the Hill-Burton program may have begun as a way to 
increase hospital facilities, and because of the early discourse 
surrounding Hill-Burton, one may draw an erroneous conclusion 
that hospitals, and in particular, inpatient services are the only 
services covered by the statute and regulations.  The definition of a 
“facility” under Hill-Burton is “an entity that received assistance 
under Title VI or Title XVI of the Act and provided a community 
service assurance.”92  In fact, Hill-Burton funds have been made 
available to many kinds of health-service entities, including 
hospitals, nursing homes, and outpatient and other healthcare 
facilities.93  The agency comments to the 1979 regulations speak to 
the obligation of recipients to allocate their uncompensated 
services “in a manner most responsive to the needs of persons 
unable to pay,”94 and give as examples that a facility might wish to 
concentrate on the provision of emergency services, or inpatient 
care, or outpatient clinic services.95
 
 91. Id. at 29,399 n.3; see Loue, supra note 
  Regarding fertility services, 
which are usually offered on an outpatient basis, and which may be 
offered within hospitals and in other, non-hospital settings, the 
form of the facility is not important.  The only requirement is that 
it be a recipient of Hill-Burton funding. 
71, at 281 (stating that one-half of 
the hospitals in the United States have received Hill-Burton funding).  Loue’s 
sources, however, appear to be restricted to documents in the early and late 1970s, 
which means that the number could be much greater.  See id. at n.66. 
 92. 42 C.F.R. § 124.602 (2007). 
 93. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 84, at 1–2. 
 94. Medical Facility Construction and Modernization; Requirements for 
Provision of Services to Persons Unable to Pay and Community Service by Assisted 
Health Facilities, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,391 (May 18, 1979) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 
124). 
 95. Id. 
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E. Conscience clauses allow providers to refuse some medical procedures. 
Perhaps the most formidable argument against the use of Hill-
Burton when ART services have been refused is illustrated in the 
Benitez case, where the physicians (albeit unsuccessfully) claimed 
that providing the requested service to Ms. Benitez violated their 
religious beliefs.96  There exist federal and state laws, so-called 
“conscience clauses,” that allow individual healthcare providers to 
refuse to perform certain medical procedures that offend their 
religious or moral convictions.97
The Church Amendment
  A full discussion of this issue is 
beyond the scope of this article.  A brief look at conscience clauses 
and how they might or might not be used as a defense to claims 
under the anti-discrimination provisions of Hill-Burton, however, is 
appropriate. 
98 was passed decades ago in 1973 
shortly after the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. 
Wade.99  It provided that any entity that received federal funds 
under any of several programs (including Hill-Burton) could not 
require any individual “to perform or assist in the performance of 
any sterilization procedure or abortion if his performance or 
assistance in the performance of such procedure or abortion would 
be contrary to his religious beliefs or moral convictions.”100  It also 
stated that no entity could be forced to offer sterilization or 
abortion procedures if it were prohibited from doing so on the 
basis of religious beliefs or moral convictions.101  More recently, 
Congress “put teeth into this insulation from government coercion 
in 2004 with the Weldon Amendment.”102
 
 96. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County, 189 P. 
3d 959, 965–70 (Cal. 2008). 
 97. See, e.g., Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience” Clauses or “Unconscionable Clauses”: 
Personal Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
269, 271–73 (2006). 
 98. Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2000)). 
  It specified that no 
federal, state, or local government agencies or programs could 
 99. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Wilson, supra note 27, at 47 (2008). 
 100. § 401(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(1) (2000)). 
 101. § 401(b)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A) (2000)). This 
part of the statute was implicated in a claim under Hill-Burton in Taylor v. St. 
Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973) (dissolving a prior injunction 
allowing a tubal ligation due to refusal by a Catholic hospital after the passage of 
the Church Amendment) aff’d 523 F. 2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 102. Wilson, supra note 27, at 49 (citing Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 508(d)(1), 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004); Act of Dec. 
30, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-149, § 508(d)(1), 119 Stat. 2833, 2879). 
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receive specified federal funds if they discriminated against a 
program that “does not provide, pay for, provide coverage of, or 
refer for abortions.”103 The Danforth Amendment104 and many state 
statutes echo the Church and Weldon Amendments, and in some 
cases, enlarge the meaning of abortion to include mere referrals 
for such services.105
Perhaps the most encompassing of the recent spate of 
conscience clause legislation is the recent federal rule entitled 
“Ensuring that Department of Health and Human Services Funds 
Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in 
Violation of Federal Law.”
 
106  This recent rule requires entities 
receiving federal funds to affirm their compliance with the Church 
and Weldon Amendments.107  It also purports to include coverage 
for individuals “in the work force,” apart from physicians and other 
providers who engage in health care directly.108  Examples given are 
surgical nurses and persons who clean instruments for certain 
medical procedures.109  The broad reading of those who “assist in 
the performance”110 of health services has led some to question 
whether secretaries who make appointments for abortion or 
abortion-related procedures could refuse to do so for reasons of 
conscience.111
Would such conscience clauses form a defense in a claim from 
a patient who has been denied fertility services?  On the one hand, 
the federal legislation is specific to sterilization and abortion, or 
abortion-related, services.  One could argue that ART is in fact the 
antithesis of sterilization and abortion procedures in that its 
purpose is to create life, rather than prevent or destroy it.  On the 
other hand, there is a certain synchronicity of cultural values that 
might make bedfellows of those who oppose abortion and those 
who oppose ART, at least for some patients.  This may mean that 
while there is no federal legislation of the Church Amendment 
 
 
 103. Consolidated Appropriations Act § 508(d)(1); Act of Dec. 30, 2005  
§ 508(d)(1). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 238n (2000). 
 105. Wilson, supra note 27, at 48–49. 
 106. Provider Conscience Regulation, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274 (Aug. 26, 2008) (to 
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 50,275. 
 111. Hillary Rodham Clinton & Cecile Richards, Blocking Care for Women, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A19. 
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variety pertinent to ART, there could be if the political will exists 
for its passage by Congress. 
Turning to conscience clauses under state law, these are too 
numerous to detail.  Suffice it to say, however, that some are not 
restricted to abortion and sterilization but to all kinds of medical 
procedures.  One commentator says that “[l]egislation in Illinois, 
for example, provided refusal clause advocates with almost 
everything on their wish list.  It protected health care personnel, 
institutions and payers from any form of liability or discrimination 
for refusing to perform almost any health care-related task against 
their conscience.”112  Thus, an individual state’s law may be broad 
enough to include ART within its definition of medical services in 
which participation may be refused.113  Interestingly, this same 
commentator compares state legislation in Mississippi, describing it 
as “topping Illinois’ as the country’s most expansive, providing 
seemingly all-encompassing lists of people and entities granted 
refusal rights, specific tasks they can refuse to perform and 
consequences from which they are immune.”114  Mr. Sonfield 
continues to state that “[u]nlike Illinois’ law, it provides no 
exceptions for information or emergency care, instead only 
prohibiting discrimination against patients on the basis of such 
characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, sex, or sexual orientation.”115
There is another difference between most conscience clause 
legislation and the situations experienced by Ms. Benitez and other 
prospective patients.  The conscience clause legislation defends the 
right of healthcare providers (however broadly or narrowly 
defined) from participation in certain procedures.  For example, a 
doctor may refuse to provide abortion services if she is morally 
opposed.  But that is different from concluding that the same 
doctor can participate in abortions or not, depending on the 
identity or characteristics of an individual patient.  Presumably, the 
Church and Weldon Amendments would not shield a physician 
  
Thus even in the most expansive state legislation (assuming this 
commentator is correct), there is attention paid to the need not to 
discriminate, at least on some enumerated bases. 
 
 112. Adam Sonfield, Provider Refusal and Access to Reproductive Health Services: 
Approaching a New Balance, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., Spring 2008, at 1, 2–3, 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/2/gpr110202.pdf. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 4. 
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
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who refused to perform abortions only on minority patients, or 
only on poor women, or who picked and chose abortion patients 
based upon any of a host of other social and/or economic 
considerations.  Thus, even if the equivalent of the Church 
Amendment were passed with regard to ART services, it would 
protect the rights of those providers who didn’t want to participate 
in the provision of any ART services, or maybe even particular ART 
services.  (For example, a provider may have moral qualms only 
about surrogacy, and would refuse to participate in this procedure 
only.)  It is difficult to imagine that the law would protect, or 
establish, a right of physicians and others to discriminate among 
patients seeking the same service. 
Finally, conscience clauses cannot operate as “all-or-nothing, 
winner-take-all accommodations”116 for providers who assert them.  
Rather, like all legally protected rights, they must balance the 
patient’s need with the provider’s rights to act in accordance with 
moral convictions.  At least one commentator speaks of the need 
for—and growing recognition of—balance between patients’ rights 
to reproduce (or simply to autonomy) and physicians’ rights to 
refuse treatment.117  As one example, Sonfield cites an opinion by 
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
in which ACOG “put itself squarely in the middle of a simmering 
debate about health care providers’ refusal to participate in sexual 
and reproductive health services.”118
VI. CONCLUSION 
  The opinion by ACOG’s 
ethics committee asserts that a right to refuse must be balanced by 
other factors and values of the medical profession, including a 
respect for patient autonomy and an intolerance of discrimination.  
This sort of balancing of rights is familiar territory in American 
jurisprudence.  Ultimately, the existence of conscience clauses, 
broad in scope or more narrowly tailored to abortion-related 
services only, should not stand as an absolute barrier to claims of 
discrimination in access to care under Hill-Burton. 
What we know about access to assisted reproductive 
technologies is that it is often limited to particular groups of 
persons, and is subject to the judgments of healthcare providers 
 
 116. Wilson, supra note 27, at 45. 
 117. Sonfield, supra note 112, at 2. 
 118. Id. 
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concerning a patient’s status, lifestyle, and other social and 
economic factors.  Existing federal and state legislation does not 
always effectively constrain providers from refusing services to 
certain individuals. 
The Hill-Burton Act, specifically its community service 
assurance, retains its vitality even after the discontinuance of the 
program and the waning of the number of hospitals who must 
comply with free service requirements.  While little litigation exists 
concerning the community service provision, the language and 
history of the Act and its regulations call for a broad reading of the 
terms “all persons.”  The 1979 regulations in particular make clear 
that discrimination against prospective patients is forbidden if 
based on non-medical reasons.  The use of Hill-Burton in cases 
involving refusal of ART services is certainly limited to those 
entities that have received Hill-Burton funding, and will apply only 
to those patients living within the designated service area.  
Conscience clause legislation or policies might conflict with claims 
under Hill-Burton.  They would not in and of themselves invalidate 
those claims, but would at most, be balanced against a patient’s 
need for medical services.  In short, the vestiges and legacy of Hill-
Burton—perhaps long forgotten and therefore deemed 
irrelevant—remain a viable tool for challenging discrimination in 
the provision of ART services.  
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